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Recently, there has been renewed interest in the business cycle properties of models with
search frictions and wage bargaining. Beginning with the seminal papers of Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2005), a growing body of literature examines the ability of business cycle models
with Mortensen-Pissarides search frictions to account for the cyclical variation of labor
market variables. One striking feature of this literature is that all models assume that
labor supply is inelastic.
Several attempts have been made to calibrate Real Business Cycle models with labor
search frictions and labor supply which is elastic along the participation margin. However,
previous authors have been unable to match key qualitative facts on the cyclical behavior
of unemployment. Ravn (2008), Tripier (2003) and Veracierto (2008) all ￿nd that their
models contradict the data by generating procyclical unemployment and a positively-
sloped Beveridge curve (a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies).
This stark qualitative failure has arguably limited the use of search frictions in business
cycle models.
The di¢ culty is simple but vexing: In response to a positive shock, some agents
may wish to enter the labor market by commencing search, swelling the ranks of the
unemployed. If the ￿ ow of workers from non-participation into search is large enough,
then unemployment becomes procyclical and is positively correlated with the procyclical
vacancies.
How to solve this conundrum? The key to ensuring that unemployment is countercycli-
cal is that vacancies react more strongly to shocks than unemployment, so that tightness
(the ratio of vacancies to unemployed) and job-￿nding rates (which are an increasing
function of tightness) increase on impact. When job-￿nding rates increase su¢ ciently,
the ￿ ows into unemployment from non-participation can be counterbalanced by ￿ ows out
of unemployment into employment, guaranteeing that unemployment begins to drop soon
after impact. Hence, the challenge is to ensure that ￿ ows into search/unemployment upon
impact are small enough, while also generating vacancies that are su¢ ciently responsive
to productivity shocks.
The key role for the elasticity of vacancies with respect to productivity is reminiscent
of the challenge posed by the Shimer puzzle. As noted by Shimer (2005) and others,
generating enough responsiveness in vacancies on impact of a productivity shock is also
important for generating su¢ cient volatility in vacancies and tightness. In this sense,
the quantitative Shimer puzzle and the qualitative procyclical unemployment puzzle are
linked.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that a calibrated RBC model with
search frictions and a participation margin is indeed able to generate both highly coun-
1tercyclical unemployment rates and a negative correlation between unemployment and
vacancies (a negatively sloped Beveridge curve). The key to success is a new calibration
strategy. First, Ravn (2008), Tripier (2003) and Veracierto (2008) all choose the elasticity
of labor supply to be either in￿nite or to match the relative volatility of employment. In
contrast, I calibrate this elasticity to match the relative volatility of participation. In the
body of the paper, I will show that the two calibration strategies are not equivalent, and
explain why targeting the volatility of the participation rate is preferable.
This subtle but important di⁄erence in calibration strategies turns out to be crucial.
The participation rate is only about 1/5 as volatile as GDP. The low volatility of the
participation rate requires that labor supply elasticity be su¢ ciently low. Low labor
supply elasticity implies that the ￿ ows of workers into and out of the labor force in reaction
to shocks are relatively small. This guarantees that the response of unemployment on
impact is relatively small. That labor supply elasticity along the participation margin
turns out to be so low is an attractive feature of this calibration, as it corresponds to the
low values typically found in microeconometric studies.
The second key element of the calibration strategy involves ensuring that vacancies
are su¢ ciently elastic to productivity shocks. This part of the calibration follows Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2008). Parameters are chosen so that the share of vacancy costs in
national income and the wage elasticity of productivity match their value in the data,
which generates wages that are sticky. The baseline calibration shares the Achilles heel of
Hagedorn and Manovksii (2008)￿ s calibration, namely that the value of worker￿ s surplus
is very low. In contrast to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), however, my main qualita-
tive results do not rely on extremely low values of worker￿ s surpluses (or equivalently on
extremely high replacement rates). In particular, the share of the wage from surplus can
rise to more than 70%, while still ensuring that unemployment rates remain countercycli-
cal. Similarly, the Beveridge curve remains negatively sloped, even if the surplus share
of the wage is nearly 30%.
Ensuring that wages wages are su¢ ciently sticky (or using the small surplus cali-
bration) is important only as a means to ensure that the incentives to create vacancies
remain strong. Any other means of generating vacancies which respond su¢ ciently to
shocks should also su¢ ce for the purposes of this paper. Possible alternatives include on
the job search as in Nagypal (2007) or downward-sloping labor demand as in Elsby and
Michaels (2008).
A ￿nal important element of the calibration strategy involves time aggregation. The
BLS measures unemployment by considering one reference week each month. Quarterly
data is obtained by averaging these monthly observations. Hence, it is possible that a
technology shock raises unemployment in the impact week or month, but that this is
subsequently reversed. As a result, the procyclical impact reaction of unemployment
2would be washed out by subsequent countercyclical movements, so that unemployment
is countercyclical in the quarterly average. I will ￿nd this to be the case.
To my knowledge, no other paper with homogeneous agents has been able to generate
countercyclical unemployment and/or a negatively sloped Beveridge curve in RBC mod-
els with search frictions and a participation margin. One model assuming heterogeneous
agents, Haefke and Reiter (2006), has also succeeded at this task. They allow for het-
erogeneous productivity in home production, combined with idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. These two model elements also serve to restrict the ￿ ow of workers into unem-
ployment due to a positive technology shock. However, the heterogeneity increases the
complexity of their analysis considerably. In contrast, the model presented in the present
paper is a standard RBC model with search frictions, and is highly tractable.
This paper also relates to an earlier literature which integrated search frictions into
business cycle models. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) showed that business cy-
cle models with search frictions could be quite successful at accounting for the cyclical
properties of macro variables, as well as for the subset of the labor variables they consid-
ered. However, neither of these models allows for a participation margin. Merz (1995)
also encounters the di¢ culty of a positively-sloped Beveridge curve when allowing for
endogenous search intensity.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, whose equilibrium is
described in section 3. The calibration strategy is described in section 4, while quantita-
tive results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
This section presents the model. It is a standard real business cycle model, augmented
by Mortensen-Pissarides labor market frictions and wage bargaining. Labor supply is
elastic along the participation margin. The bargaining setup involves ￿rms bargaining
individually with each worker. Agents are risk averse and are organized into large house-
holds which provide full insurance against idiosyncratic consumption ￿ uctuations. The
production technology is Cobb-Douglas with labor and capital as inputs. This model can
be seen as the natural extension of the RBC literature to allow for search frictions and
decentralized wage bargaining. It is very similar to the models studied in Ravn (2008),
Tripier (2003) and Veracierto (2008).
2.1 Household￿ s Problem
The household chooses consumption ct, investment in physical capital it and the fraction
of household members engaged in search ut to maximize its discounted expected utility,
3represented by the Bellman equation:
V (nt￿1;kt￿1) = max
ct;it;ut
fu(ct;lt;ut) + ￿EtV (nt;kt)g (1)
subject to the large-family budget, time and transition constraints
wtnt￿1 + rtkt￿1 + ￿t ￿ ct + it (2)
kt = (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1 + it (3)
1 = nt￿1 + ut + lt (4)
nt = (1 ￿ ￿)nt￿1 + ftut (5)
The fraction nt￿1 family members earn the wage wt, while ut are searching for work. The
fraction lt of household members do not participate in the labor market. The household
owns the capital stock kt￿1, which it rents at market rate rt to ￿rms. Capital depre-
ciates at constant rate ￿. Due to search frictions in the labor market, the household￿ s
date t stock of employed workers nt￿1 acts like a capital stock, which depreciates at
the exogenous separation rate ￿. Households cannot choose current period employment
directly. Instead, they can invest in next period employment by sending workers into
search, understanding that date t searching workers ut will ￿nd jobs at (endogenous) rate
ft.
2.1.1 Speci￿cation of Utility
In the calibrated model, the utility function is speci￿ed as:








In models with inelastic labor supply and risk-neutral individual agents (cf. Pissarides
(2000) or Shimer (2005)), the utility function is linear: u(ct) = ct + bIu, where ct is
consumption of the market good, b is the non-market ￿ ow utility to unemployment and
Iu is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when the agent is unemployed. Under
the large family paradigm, the indicator is replaced by the fraction of family members
who are searching ut.
In addition, including the participation margin implies that one must model the utility
from non-participation explicitly. In the speci￿cation used here, non-participants and
searchers contribute to household utility in distinct ways. It is useful to think of the
utility from non-participation as being derived from home production. Among all non-
participants, 73.3% cite "taking care of house or family" as the reason for their non-
4participation1. Thus, it is fair to assume that home production is a major motivation
for non-participation. The other major reasons cited by non-participants were being in
education and being disabled or retired. Moreover, the work of Aguiar and Hurst (2005,
2007) emphasizes the importance of home production in the time use of retirees. Hence,
it seems reasonable to think of the utility from non-participation as deriving from some
home-produced goods or services. Under the utility function speci￿ed above, one can
think of a linear production function (so that the amount of the home good produced is
lt) and power utility over consumption of the home good. The parameter ￿ would then
represent the intertemporal elasticity of substitution over the home good, low values
of ￿ indicating that households are reluctant to substitute the home good over time.
Equivalently, ￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution over time use, so that low
values of ￿ indicate that households are reluctant to adjust the fraction of non-participants
over time.2 For brevity, I will refer to v as the participation elasticity in the remainder
of the paper.
There is also good reason to think of b as a non-market leisure bene￿t rather than
either an unemployment insurance payment in units of the market good or some contribu-
tion to home production3. First, the large family assumption ensures that consumption
is perfectly insured against idiosyncratic unemployment risk, so that there is no rationale
for unemployment insurance in this model. Moreover, in the US, relatively few unem-
ployed workers receive rather modest bene￿ts. According to data from the Department
of Labor for 1967-2007, only 37.1% of unemployed workers received unemployment insur-
ance payments, which replaced on average 35% of wages. Second, there is little evidence
that unemployed workers contribute substantially to home production. According to data
from the 2006 American Time Use Survey, conditional on having children under 18 in the
household, employed and unemployed workers spent exactly the same amount of time
engaged in childcare (328 minutes daily). Compared to the employed, the unemployed
spent only 21 additional minutes on housework (135 versus 114 minutes daily), about the
time it takes to wash the dishes. Job search activities ￿lled only 20 minutes of the aver-
age day. The main activities for which the unemployed do use their extra time are sleep
and leisure, primarily in the form of watching television4. Hence, it seems reasonable to
1Source: March 2008 Current Population Survey.
2Alternatively, one can think of utility in the home good being linear (so that its elasticity of substitu-
tion is in￿nite), but its production being subject to decreasing returns to scale (for ￿ > 1). Small values of
￿ would then indicate that the marginal product to home production of each additional non-participant
is decreasing swiftly.
3An earlier version of this paper assumed b to be a transfer in units of the good. This transfer entered
the household budget constraint, but not the utility function. Results are very similar and are available
on request.
4The unemployed sleep 68 minutes per day more than the employed, and they enjoy 90 additional
minutes of leisure, of which 56 minutes are spent watching television.
5assume that the bene￿ts from unemployment take the form of leisure rather than home
production or units of the good.
2.1.2 Solution to the Household￿ s Problem
The solution to the large family￿ s problem takes the form of two Euler equations, which





[rt+1 + 1 ￿ ￿]
￿
(7)
where uc;t ￿ uc (ct;lt;ut). The second Euler equation re￿ ects the household￿ s participation
decision
ul;t ￿ uu;t = ft￿Et
￿






The left-hand side of (8) re￿ ects the marginal disutility to increasing the family￿ s labor
force participation, which involves shifting workers from non-participation into search.
The right hand side captures the discounted marginal bene￿t to employment, scaled by
the endogenous rate at which searching workers ￿nd jobs ft.
2.2 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by a standard search and matching framework. Ag-
gregate stocks of unemployed workers Ut and vacancies Vt are converted into job matches




t . De￿ning labor
market tightness as ￿t ￿ Vt
Ut, the ￿rm meets unemployed workers at rate qt = s￿
￿￿
t , while
the unemployed workers meet vacancies at rate ft = s￿
1￿￿
t . Aggregate employment Nt
evolves as
Nt = (1 ￿ ￿)Nt￿1 + ftUt (9)
where ￿ is the exogenous match destruction rate.
Workers are identical and bargaining is individual. De￿ne e ￿t+1 ￿ ￿
uc;t+1
uc;t to be the
households￿stochastic discount factor. The household￿ s surplus is derived in the Appendix
from the Bellman equation (1) as the marginal value to the household of an additional
employed worker6:
Vn;t = wtuc;t ￿ uu;t + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ft)￿Et [Vn;t+1] (10)
5Both the household￿ s optimization problem and its solution are very similar to those analyzed in
Ravn (2008).
6The derivation of surplus is similar to that in Ravn (2008) or Trigari (2006).
6Finally, worker￿ s surplus in utility terms (10) can be converted into units of the good by













2.3 Firm￿ s Problem
There is a continuum of identical ￿rms on the unit interval. Firms are perfectly compet-
itive and produce using a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future pro￿ts, and produce using labor and
rented capital. They adjust employment by varying the number of workers rather than
the number of hours per worker, consistent with stylized facts.
Firms face search frictions in the labor market, so that they cannot adjust employ-
ment in the current period. Employment is a state variable, and behaves like a capital
stock. Firms can add to their future stock of employment capital by investing in current
vacancies vt, which cost ￿ each and are transformed into employed workers next period
at the endogenous job-￿lling rate qt. The ￿rm￿ s Bellman equation is:
J (nt￿1;zt) = max
vt;kt￿1
n











transition function : nt = (1 ￿ ￿)nt￿1 + qtvt (14)
technology shock : lnzt = ￿lnzt￿1 + "t (15)




















Equation (17) equates the cost of searching for a worker ￿
qt to the expected discounted
bene￿ts to hiring a worker. These bene￿ts consist of the worker￿ s marginal product net
of the wage, plus a term which represents hiring costs that will be saved next period if
the worker is not separated. In addition, it is useful to note that the ￿rm￿ s surplus under
7individual bargaining can be obtained from the envelope condition of the ￿rm￿ s problem
Jn;t = (1 ￿ ￿)
yt
nt￿1




2.4 Individual Wage Bargaining
The key assumption of the individual bargaining framework is that ￿rms cannot commit
to long-term employment contracts, and may renegotiate wages with each worker at any
time. This makes each worker e⁄ectively the marginal worker.7 Hence, the ￿rm￿ s outside
option is not remaining idle, but rather producing with one worker less, so that ￿rm￿ s
surplus is the marginal value of a worker.
Individual bargaining is the appropriate bargaining setup when studying the business
cycle properties of the US economy, because "Employment at will" is dominant in US
labor markets. Under employment at will, both ￿rms and workers can terminate the
employment relationship at any time, without justi￿cation. As a result, wages can be
renegotiated with any worker at any time, as assumed under individual bargaining.






+ (1 ￿ ￿)lnJn;t (19)
subject to ￿rm surplus (18) and worker￿ s surplus (11). Worker￿ s bargaining power is given
by ￿.
Proposition 1 The solution to the bargaining problem (19) subject to (18)
and (11) is given by











Proof See the appendix.
Equation (20) is the wage curve.
3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is de￿ned as sequences of prices and labor market tightnesses which solve
the ￿rm￿ s, the household￿ s and the bargaining problems and which let markets clear. The
7The individual bargaining framework was introduced in partial equilibrium by Stole and Zwiebel
(1996), and extended to general equilibrium by Smith (1999) and Ebell and Haefke (2009).
8solution satis￿es the household￿ s Euler equations (7) and (8), the household constraints
(2)-(5), the ￿rm￿ s optimality conditions (16) and (17), the ￿rm￿ s constraints (13)-(15), the
wage curve (20), the transition equation for aggregate unemployment (9) and appropriate
market-clearing conditions.
This de￿nition of equilibrium yields a system of fourteen equations in the fourteen
unknowns (nt;lt;kt;ft;qt;￿t;ut;vt;wt;yt;ct;it;rt;zt). The log-linearized system is solved
by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, implemented using Uhlig (1999)￿ s toolkit. A
list of all equations, both in levels and log-linearized, is provided in the Appendix.
4 Calibration
Period length is one week. There are fourteen parameters to pin down: the technology
parameter A, the participation elasticity ￿, the utility weight ￿, matching elasticity ￿,
vacancy costs ￿, worker￿ s bargaining power ￿, the output elasticity of capital ￿, the ￿ ow
utility to unemployment b, the depreciation rate ￿, the match destruction rate ￿, and
the matching scale parameter s, the discount factor ￿ and the two parameters of the
productivity shock ￿ and ￿".
The baseline calibration is summarized in Table 1.8 The novel element of the baseline
calibration strategy is the use of the relative volatility of the participation rate to pin
down the participation elasticity ￿. This strategy plays an important role in establish-
ing the calibrated model￿ s ability to generate countercyclical unemployment rates and a
negatively sloped Beveridge curve, despite the presence of elastic labor supply along the
participation margin.
The technology parameter A is normalized to one. The parameters of the weekly log
productivity process are chosen to match the autocorrelation and volatility of output per
worker in post-war quarterly US data. Choosing weekly autocorrelation ￿w = 0:9895
and weekly standard deviation of the innovation ￿";w = 0:34 % leads to quarterly auto-
correlation ￿q = 0:765 and quarterly unconditional volatility ￿z;q = 1:3 %.9 Matching
elasticity ￿ is set to 0:50, within the range reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
The discount factor ￿ is chosen to match an annual risk-free rate e r ￿ 1
￿ ￿ 1 of 4%. The
capital elasticity of output ￿ is set at 0:36, a standard value. The depreciation rate for
capital is chosen so that the investment share of income i
y = 0:25, its value in the post-war
data reported by Francis and Ramey (2001). The weekly calibrated value of ￿ = 0:0019
corresponds to an annual depreciation rate of about 9:0%. The weekly separation rate ￿
is set to 0:0081, which corresponds to the monthly rate of ￿ = 0:026 estimated by Shimer
(2005). Similarly, the target for the weekly job-￿nding rate f is 0.139, which corresponds
8A complete derivation of all calibrated parameters and the steady state is o⁄ered in the Appendix.
9These values are identical to those chosen in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
9to Shimer (2005)￿ s monthly value of 0.45. Together ￿ and f pin down the equilibrium
unemployment rate e u ￿ u
u+n via the Beveridge curve e u =
￿
￿+f at 5.5 %. The target for
the job-￿lling rate q is that of Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), who ￿nd q to be
0.71 monthly, corresponding to a weekly value of 0.266. Together, the targets for f and
q pin down the steady-state labor market tightness as ￿ =
f
q = 0:523. The latter ￿gure
is in roughly line with the average tightness value in the data of 0.465, obtained using
JOLTS data for December 2000 to June 2007. Together, the targets for q and f also pin
down the scaling parameter of the matching function, which becomes s = 0:192:
I follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) in estimating that hiring a worker costs 7.6
% of the worker￿ s annual wage10. This yields a share of vacancy costs in national income
of ￿v = 1:6%11. ￿v = ￿￿
q
n
y pins down vacancy posting costs ￿12.
Next, worker￿ s bargaining power ￿ is chosen so that wages respond to technology
shocks in a way that matches the data. The baseline calibration chooses ￿ to match the
wage elasticity of productivity, which has been estimated to be "w;z = 0:449 by Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008)13. Choosing ￿ = 0:026 achieves this target. Although Haefke,
et. al. (2008) report higher point estimates for the wage elasticity of productivity,
their standard errors are so large that their estimates for the wage elasticity of labor
productivity still lie within about one standard error of the baseline target used here.14
Due to the controversy surrounding these estimates, I will allow the target for "w;z to
vary widely from the baseline when reporting the results.
Now, one can use the steady-state versions of labor demand (17) and the wage curve
(20) to obtain an equation which relates the bene￿t to unemployment b to parameters,


















10In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), labor costs are 4.5% of quarterly wages, corresponding to 1.1 %
of annual wages, while capital costs are 6.5 % of annual wages.
11If hiring a worker costs 0.076 of annual wages, then ￿









= ￿A ￿ 0:076 ￿ ￿n
Using that ￿A = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿W)
48 = 0:323 is the annual probability of being separated, and that labour
share of income is 0.64 yields ￿v = 1:57 %.
12Note that n
y is pinned down by
y
n = A k
n
￿
, where capital intensity comes from the consumption Euler






13The model￿ s wage elasticity of productivity is obtained, following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008),
by regressing the model-generated wages on model-generated labor productivity
yt
nt.
14Haefke, et. al. (2008) use CPS data on job-movers and ￿nd an OLS point estimate of "w;z = 0:94
with a standard error of 0:44. When controlling for the di⁄ering industry composition of new jobs versus
all jobs, the OLS point estimate drops to 0:73 with a standard error of 0:48. Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) use PSID data and obtain a point estimate of "w;z = 0:449 with a standard error of 0:042.
10where c,
y
n and ￿ can be calculated using the parameters which have already been pinned
down. The replacement rate b
w is not meaningful under the utility function (6).15 Instead,
I report the fraction of the wage which is due to reservation utility in the steady state:
(1￿￿)bc
w = 0:96, so that worker￿ s surplus makes up about 4% of the steady state wage.
This low value has been criticized as being unrealistic, since it would seem to give workers
little incentive to work rather than be unemployed. In the model presented here, however,
the relevant decision is participation versus non-participation, not unemployment versus
employment. Nonetheless, as indicated above, I will allow the target for "w;z (and hence
the fraction of the wage due to surplus) to vary widely when analyzing the results in the
following section.
Finally, the utility parameters ￿ and ￿ remain to be set. The participation elasticity ￿
is set so that the volatility of the participation rate matches the data. Targeting a relative
volatility of participation of
￿p
￿y = 0:20 results in a participation elasticity of ￿ = 0:768.
One can read the resulting partial elasticity of participation with respect to technology
shocks o⁄ the model￿ s recursive law of motion. In the baseline model a 1% increase in
TFP leads to a 0.34 % increase in labor force participation. This is in line with numerous
microeconometric estimates for labor supply elasticity which are smaller than unity. The
weight on utility from the non-participants ￿ is chosen so that the steady-state fraction
1 ￿ l of family members who participate in the labor market matches the average rate
of labor market participation in the US from 1964 to 2006 at 64%. Setting ￿ = 0:37
achieves this target.
5 Results
Results of the baseline calibration are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 5. The results of the
weekly calibration have been aggregated to a quarterly frequency, so that they can be
compared to the quarterly data. In what follows, I will ￿rst discuss the model￿ s success at
generating countercyclical unemployment and a negatively sloped Beveridge curve despite
labor supply which is elastic along the participation margin. Next, the impact of elastic
labor supply on the ability of the model to account for the volatilities and elasticities of
labor market variables with respect to productivity is discussed.
5.1 Countercyclical Unemployment
The baseline calibration generates unemployment rates e ut which are almost exactly as
countercyclical as in the data, ￿model (e u;y) = ￿0:87 versus ￿data (e u;y) = ￿0:88. The
15This is because the wage is denominated in terms of the consumption good, while b is not.
11calibrated model also generates a negatively sloped Beveridge curve, although the con-
temporaneous correlation between unemployment and vacancies ￿model (e u;v) = ￿0:44 falls
short of its value in the data ￿data (e u;v) = ￿0:97. The mere fact that model unemploy-
ment rates are strongly countercyclical and the model Beveridge curve negatively sloped
is surprising. Previous authors studying RBC models with search frictions and elastic
labor supply along the participation margin (Ravn (2008), Tripier (2003) and Veracierto
(2008)) have consistently found their models to generate procyclical unemployment and
a positively sloped Beveridge curve, contradicting the stylized facts.
The calibrated model presented in this paper is able to succeed at generating coun-
tercyclical unemployment rates and a negatively sloped Beveridge curve due to three
elements of the calibration: low intertemporal substitution elasticity over time use ￿, the
low bargaining power ￿ (i.e. matching a wage elasticity of productivity smaller than
unity a la Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008) and the weekly calibration. In what follows, I
discuss each of these factors in detail.
5.1.1 Targeting Participation Volatility
The ￿rst reason that the model presented here succeeds at generating countercyclical
unemployment and a negatively-sloped Beveridge curve is the calibration strategy for the
participation elasticity parameter ￿. In the baseline calibration, I choose ￿ to match the
relative volatility of the participation rate
￿p
￿y = 0:20, leading to ￿ = 0:768. In contrast,
Ravn (2008), Tripier (2003) and Veracierto (2008) have all chosen higher values for ￿.
Ravn (2008) focuses on utility functions that are linear in non-participation, and hence
are characterized by in￿nite elasticity. Veracierto (2008) sets the participation elasticity
parameter to match the relative volatility of employment ￿n
￿y. Tripier (2003) reports
results to one calibration in which participation is in￿nitely elastic, and two in which he
chooses participation elasticity to match employment volatility, corresponding to a value
of ￿ of about 3. Figure 1 shows the impact of varying the participation elasticity ￿ on
the key correlations of the unemployment rate e u with vacancies, output and employment.
Clearly, increasing ￿ makes the calibrated model less successful at matching these key
correlations, underlining its importance.
Why does the low participation elasticity implied by targeting
￿p
￿y help to gener-
ate countercyclical unemployment and a negatively-sloped Beveridge curve? To under-
stand this, compare impulse-response functions for the low-elasticity case (the baseline,
￿ = 0:768) and a high-elasticity case (￿ = 5:0), shown in Figures 2 and 3 respectively.
In both cases, vacancies respond to a positive productivity shock by increasing sharply.16
16The high elasticity of vacancies to productivity shocks is due to the small surplus calibration (i.e.
choosing the bargaining power to match the wage elasticity of productivity), and will be discussed in the
next sub-section.
12In the low-elasticity baseline, relatively few workers enter search from non-participation
in response to the positive productivity shock, so that the uptick in unemployment on
impact is modest. The strong response of vacancies, coupled with the modest response
of unemployment rates, lead tightness and job-￿nding rates to increase strongly in the
baseline case. The strong increase on impact in job-￿nding rates ensures that the unem-
ployed workers ￿nd jobs quickly, so that unemployment begins to decline about 4 weeks
after the shock. As a result, quarterly unemployment rates are quite countercyclical, and
the correlation between unemployment rates and vacancies is negative.
In the high elasticity case of Figure 3, in contrast, relatively many workers respond to
the positive productivity shock by entering search from non-participation, as is re￿ ected in
the large downward movement of non-participation. As a result, the uptick in unemploy-
ment on impact is nearly as large as the surge in vacancies. Not only does this generate
a positive correlation between the unemployment rate and vacancies (￿(e u;v) = 0:70), it
also leads to only modest increases in tightness and job-￿nding rates. The combination
of a larger increase in unemployment rates coupled with a smaller increase in job-￿nding
rates makes it more di¢ cult for the impact on unemployment to be reversed. In particu-
lar, it now takes two months for unemployment rates to decline in response to the positive
productivity shock, making unemployment less countercyclical (￿(e u;y) = ￿0:32) than in
the baseline.
The cost of targeting participation volatility rather than employment volatility (as
in Veracierto, 2008 or Tripier, 2003) is of course that the model is not able to match
employment volatility perfectly. Figure 4 shows relative employment and participation
volatilities as a function of the participation elasticity ￿. The fact that relative participa-
tion volatility
￿p
￿y is more sensitive to ￿ implies that matching this target exactly comes
at a smaller cost in terms of distance between the model and data relative employment
volatilities than vice-versa.17
Another way of seeing why the di⁄erence between targeting participation and em-
ployment volatility is important is by doing a bit of volatility accounting. First, note
that participation pt is equal to the sum of employment ht and unemployment ut.18 As

























Matching the relative volatility of the participation rate
￿p
￿y would only be equivalent to
17Indeed, Veracierto (2008) matches relative employment volatility exactly, but reports a model-
generated relative participation volatility of 0.58:
18In the log-linearized model, this corresponds to pb pt = ub ut +hb ht, where p is the steady-state partici-
pation rate and b pt is the log-deviation.
13matching the relative volatility of employment ￿n
￿y if both models generated the same
relative unemployment volatility and the same correlation between unemployment and
employment ￿(u;n).19 Otherwise, the two calibration strategies yield di⁄erent results.
From Figure 1, it is easy to see that the baseline calibration does much better at matching
the correlation between the unemployment rate and employment, making it easier to
reconcile the relative volatilities in equation (21).
5.1.2 Wage Elasticity
A second important element of the calibration strategy is the use of a small surplus cal-
ibration following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), which chooses worker￿ s bargaining
power ￿ to match the wage elasticity of productivity "w;z. Figure 5 summarizes the be-
havior of key calibrations when the wage elasticity of productivity is varied20. The model
wage elasticity of productivity "w;z can be increased quite substantially from its baseline
value of 0.449 to about 0.70, while still generating strongly countercyclical unemployment
(￿(e u;y) = ￿0:79) and a negatively sloped Beveridge curve (￿(e u;v) = ￿0:27)21. As "w;z
approaches unity, however, the performance of the calibrated model deteriorates rapidly:
unemployment becomes nearly acyclical and the Beveridge curve becomes strongly posi-
tively sloped.
Why is it important that wage elasticities remain below unity to generate counter-
cyclical unemployment and a negatively sloped Beveridge curve? The key is the calibrated
model￿ s ability to generate vacancies which react strongly enough to productivity shocks.
To see this, compare two sets of impulse responses which di⁄er only according to their
wage elasticity. Figure 2 presents the baseline, while Figure 6 presents a high wage elas-
ticity case with ￿ = 0:50 and "w;z = 0:96. In the baseline case of Figure 2, vacancies
increase much more strongly to the positive productivity shock than does unemployment.
As a result, tightness and job-￿nding rates also increase strongly, so that the positive im-
pact reaction of unemployment is quickly reversed, allowing unemployment to remain
countercyclical on average.
When the wage elasticity of productivity is increased to near unity, however, as in
Figure 6, this mechanism breaks down. When wages react nearly one for one to a pro-
ductivity shock, there is little increase in surplus for ￿rms, and vacancies do not increase
much more than unemployment. This leads to a positive correlation between the un-
employment rate and vacancies (￿(e u;v) = 0:59). Also, the increases in tightness and
19The steady state values of employment n, unemployment u and participation p are matched exactly
in all calibrations.
20Figure 5 was generated by varying the target for the wage elasticity of productivity, but maintaining
all other targets.
21When the wage elasticity of productivity is "w;z = 0:70, 15% of the wage is derived from match
surplus.
14job-￿nding rates are also very small, so that it takes about twice as long for the ￿ ows into
search (i.e. the initial upward tick in unemployment) to be counterbalanced by ￿ ows out
of search and into employment. This leads to a lower degree of countercyclicality in the
unemployment rate (￿(e u;y) = ￿0:27).
The calibration strategy of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) has come under strong
criticism due to the high replacement rates it implies. As mentioned in Section 4, the
replacement rate b
w is meaningless in the model presented here. As an alternative, I report
the steady state share of the wage which is due to reservation utility
b(1￿￿)c
w . Figure 7
shows the behavior of key correlations as functions of this alternative measure to the
replacement rate. Clearly, the calibrated model can still generate strongly countercyclical
unemployment and a negatively sloped Beveridge curve, even if the share of surplus in
the wage rises to about 25%. Moreover, unemployment remains countercyclical, even if
the wage share of surplus is allowed to increase to 70% or more. This implies that the
calibrated model￿ s main results - the ability to generate countercyclical unemployment
and a negatively sloped Beveridge curve - do not rest solely on extremely small surpluses.
5.1.3 Time Aggregation
Another reason that the calibrated model succeeds at generating realistic behavior of
unemployment has to do with time aggregation and data collection. The BLS samples
unemployment and vacancies for one reference week each month.22 That is, subjects
are asked whether they were searching for work not during the entire month, but only
during the reference week. As a result, it is possible that a worker enters the labor force
between reference weeks, searches for up to 3 weeks, ￿nds a job, and is never recorded as
unemployed. This is especially relevant in good times, when job-￿nding rates are high.23
In addition, since productivity data is available quarterly, one can only assess the cycli-
cal behavior of unemployment at a quarterly frequency. The quarterly data is obtained
as an average of monthly values. Hence, a small upward tick in monthly unemployment
on impact of a positive technology shock would be averaged with the lagged downward
movements in subsequent months. As a result, the average unemployment rate over the
quarter might respond negatively to a positive productivity shock, despite an uptick in
the impact month.
To address these issues, the baseline calibration has a weekly frequency. The weekly
results are then aggregated to a quarterly frequency by taking averages, the quarterly se-
ries are HP-￿ltered, and then the correlations, standard deviations and impulse-responses
are calculated.
22I refer here to collection procedures for the Current Population Survey, described on the BLS website
under www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm.
23Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) make a very similar point, and also implement a weekly calibration.
15To examine the impact of the weekly versus the equivalent quarterly calibration, re-
sults of the latter are presented in Table 6 and Figure 8. The quarterly impulse-responses
of Figure 8 show that vacancies, unemployment rates, tightness and job-￿nding rates re-
act in fundamentally the same way as in the weekly calibration. The impact of a positive
technology shock is greater on vacancies than on unemployment, so that tightness and
job-￿nding rates increase on impact. As a result, enough searchers ￿nd jobs immediately,
and the unemployment rate already begins to decline one quarter after impact. Although
the contemporaneous quarterly correlation between GDP and the unemployment rate in
the baseline is of relatively small magnitude at ￿0:45, the lagged quarterly correlation
between yt and e ut+1 is highly negative at ￿0:89. Similarly, the contemporaneous correla-
tion between the unemployment rate and vacancies is positive, but the lagged correlation
is highly negative at ￿0:70. Aggregating up to a biannual or annual frequency would
hence cause the contemporaneous correlations with the unemployment rate to be (more
strongly) negative, in the same way that aggregating from weekly to quarterly did.
5.2 The Shimer Puzzle
Finally, given the recent literature on the Shimer (2005) puzzle, it seems sensible to
report on the ability of the model to account for the behavior of labor market variables
over the cycle. In a framework with inelastic labor supply, it is well known that the
small surplus calibration of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) is able to match the raw
volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and tightness relative to productivity in the data
reported in Table 4. The question is whether these results carry over to the case with
elastic labor supply. Results for the baseline calibration are presented in Table 5. Clearly,
introducing even a modest amount of participation elasticity diminishes the ability of the
small surplus calibration to match the raw volatilities of key labor market variables.
Figure 9 shows the impact of increasing the target wage elasticity of productivity on
the relative volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and tightness. Not surprisingly, the
relative volatilities are decreasing in "w;z. Figure 10 shows the impact of increasing the
increasing the participation elasticity parameter ￿ (i.e. target relative volatility of par-
ticipation) on these key labor market volatilities. It is interesting to note that the ability
of the calibrated model to account for highly volatile labor market tightness disappears
as participation becomes more elastic. The reason is that in the high participation elas-
ticity case (see the impulse-responses of Figure 3), both vacancies and unemployment
rise sharply in response to a positive productivity shock. This implies that their ratio,
labor market tightness ￿, responds only very weakly to the productivity shock, so that
the volatility of tightness remains quite low.
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Pissarides (2007) argue that it is more appro-
16priate to convert the raw volatilities into elasticities, to account for the fact that labor
productivity is not the only source of cyclical variation. In the data, the elasticity of a
labor market variable x with respect to productivity z is obtained as "x;z = ￿x
￿z￿x;z.24 The
results of calculating the elasticities of labor market variables with respect to productivity
in the same way in both the model and the data are presented in Table 7.
5.3 The "Consumption-Tightness Puzzle"
In recent work, Ravn (2008) presents an analytic approach to the "Shimer Puzzle". He
derives a closed form relationship relating the amount of volatility in tightness that can
be generated to the model￿ s consumption volatility and parameters. In the appendix, I















(￿ ￿ b)ct (23)
Comparing (22) to (23) highlights that the two models are very similar. The crucial
di⁄erence is the speci￿cation of the utility function. Ravn (2008) assumes utility which
is linear in leisure, so that labor supply over the participation margin is in￿nitely elastic,
while I allow for ￿nite participation elasticity ￿. Indeed, equation (22) corresponds to (23)
for the special case in which labor supply elasticity is in￿nite (v ! 1). Log-linearizing
24I follow Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Pissarides (2007) in using the data correlations reported
in Shimer (2005). These are reproduced in the ￿nal column of Table 4.
25Ravn￿ s original utility function is:
u = lnct + H (1 ￿ s ￿ lt)nt + H (1 ￿ s)ut + H (1)(1 ￿ nt ￿ ut)
where lt are hours worked by the nt employed family members, ut is the share of searchers, (1 ￿ nt ￿ ut)
is the share of non-participants and H (1) and H (1 ￿ s) are constants. I have adapted Ravn (2006)￿ s
notation to mine. Renaming the constants as H (1) = ￿, H (1 ￿ s) = b
u(ct;ut;nt) = lnct + f (lt)nt + but + ￿(1 ￿ nt ￿ ut)




H (1) ￿ H (1 ￿ s)
￿
ct







17both sides of (22) and (23) respectively yields:







b lt + b ct (24)
b ￿t = b ct (25)
where variables with hats are log-deviations from the steady state b xt = ln xt
x and I have
used the steady state versions of (22) and (23) to simplify some parameters. Hence, the
variance of tightness, consumption and non-participation over the cycle are are related
as:
￿￿ =




























. Note that taking the limit as ￿ ! 1 yields
the tight relationship between tightness and consumption volatilities derived in Ravn
(2008): ￿￿ = ￿c.
The consumption-tightness relationship of equation (26) provides an analytic basis
for the simulation results presented above. According to (26), three parameters are im-
portant in generating high volatility of tightness despite a low volatility of consumption:
participation elasticity ￿, ￿ ow utility to unemployment b, and the utility weight on the
home good ￿. Due to the negative correlation between log-deviations in consumption







ously increase the wedge between ￿￿ and ￿c generated by the model. As a result, low
participation elasticity ￿ makes tightness more volatile for given consumption volatility,
corresponding to the simulation results of Figure 10.
In addition, the gap between the steady state marginal utilities to non-participation
￿l￿ 1
￿ and to search b is crucial for the ability of the model to generate very volatile labor
market tightness. Taking the steady state of the household￿ s participation Euler equation














Now it is the ratio between the marginal utility to obtaining the wage w
c and the marginal
utility to non-participation (home production) ￿l￿ 1
￿ which must be near unity in order
to generate highly volatile tightness. This re￿ ects that the key decision is whether to
participate or not. That is, the closer agents are to being indi⁄erent between being
26Ravn (2008) reports a correlation in the data between participation and consumption of 0.27, so
that the correlation between non-participation and consumption must be negative. In the model, the
correlation between ct and lt is indeed negative, taking the value ￿0:58.
18employed and not participating at all, the greater is the ability of the model to amplify
consumption ￿ uctuations into tightness volatility.
6 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a business cycle model with
labor search frictions and a participation margin can indeed give qualitatively and quan-
titatively sensible results. The calibrated model succeeds at generating countercyclical
unemployment and a negatively-sloped Beveridge curve, despite the presence of elastic
labor supply along the extensive (participation) margin. The key to success is a small sur-
plus calibration strategy that chooses participation elasticity so as to match the volatility
of the participation rate and that uses a small surplus calibration to ensure that vacancies
are su¢ ciently responsive to productivity shocks.
19Table 1
Baeline Calibration (Weekly)
Parameter Baseline Value Parameter Baseline Value
A 1.0 ￿ 0.0019
￿ 0.9895 s 0.192
￿" 0.34 ￿ 8.28
￿ 0.50 ￿ 0.026
￿ 0.0081 b 1.38
￿ 0.9992 ￿ 0.768
￿ 0.36 ￿ 0.37
Table 2
Baseline Results: Business Cycle
Relative Volatility ￿x
￿y Data Model Correlations ￿(x;y) Data Model
Output 1.00 1.00 Output 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.57 0.21 Consumption 0.80 0.73
Investment 4.28 3.25 Investment 0.91 0.99
Capital 0.43 0.25 Capital 0.05 0.17
Employment 0.57 0.42 Employment 0.81 0.98
Participation 0.20 0.20 Participation 0.39 0.97
Productivity 0.63 0.73 Productivity 0.84 0.99
Table 2: Data values are those reported in Veracierto (2008) for quarterly US
data, 1967:1 to 1999:4.
Table 3
Baseline Results: Key Unemployment Correlations
x ￿(y;e u) ￿(v;e u) ￿(n;e u)
Data ￿0.88 ￿0.97 ￿0.95
Model Baseline ￿0.87 ￿0.44 ￿0.93
Table 3: Data correlations are based upon quarterly BLS data from 1964 Q1-
2005 Q4 which has been HP-￿ltered using Ravn and Uhlig (2002)￿ s optimal para-
meter value for quarterly data of 1600. Each simulated time series of 1800 weeks
(37.5 years) is aggregated to quarterly frequency, and then model correlations are
calculated as averages over 50 simulated time series.
20Table 4
Shimer￿ s summary statistics, quarterly US data, 1951-2003
x e u v v=e u f z
Standard deviation 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.020
Relative Std. deviation ￿x
￿z 9.5 10.1 19.1 5.9 1.0
Autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.908 0.878
Correlation matrix e u 1 ￿0.894 ￿0.971 ￿0.949 ￿0.408
v ￿ 1 0.975 0.897 0.364
v=e u ￿ ￿ 1 0.948 0.396
f ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 0.396
z ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
Table 4: Source: Shimer (2005, Table 1), augmented by own calculations of the
relative standard deviations ￿x
￿z.
Table 5
Baseline Results: Cyclicality of Labor Market Variables
x e u v v=e u f z
Relative Std deviation ￿x
￿z 5.8 8.7 12.4 6.1 1.0
Autocorrelation 0.72 0.50 0.74 0.74 0.75
Correlation matrix e u 1 ￿0.44 ￿0.77 ￿0.77 ￿0.81
v ￿ 1 0.91 0.91 0.86
v=e u ￿ ￿ 1 1.00 0.99
f ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 0.99
z ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
Table 5: All variables reported are log deviations from an HP trend.
21Table 6
Key Unemployment Correlations: Quarterly Calibration
x ￿(y;e u) ￿(v;e u) ￿(n;e u)
Data ￿0.88 ￿0.97 ￿0.95
Model baseline quarterly ￿0.45 0.41 ￿0.20
Table 6: Data correlations are based upon quarterly BLS data from 1964 Q1-2005
Q4 which has been HP-￿ltered using Ravn and Uhlig (2002)￿ s optimal parameter
value for quarterly data of 1600. Model correlations are calculated as averages over
100 simulated quarterly time series of 150 quarters (37.5 years).
Table 7
Elasticities of Labor Market Variables
"e u;z "v;z "￿;z
Data ￿3.88 3.68 7.56
Baseline ￿2.37 3.17 7.48
Table 7: Elasticities calculated as "x;z = ￿x
￿z￿x;z, where ￿x;z is the correlation in
the data, as suggested by Mortensen and Nagypal (2007).





























Figure 1: Correlations between unemployment rates and vacancies, output
and employment respectively, plotted as functions of the participation elasticity
￿. Varying ￿ implies that the relative volatility of participation will deviate from
its baseline target value. All other baseline calibration targets are maintained.
























































Figure 2: Impulse-responses to a 1% shock to productivity in the baseline cali-
bration.



























































Figure 3: Impulse-responses to a 1% shock to productivity, high participation
elasticity ￿ = 5:0, all other baseline calibration targets maintained.






































Figure 4: Impact of varying participation elasticity ￿ on relative volatilities
of participation and employment. All other baseline calibration targets are main-
tained.































Figure 5: Key correlations as functions of the target wage elasticity of produc-
tivity "w;z. All other baseline calibration targets are maintained.



























































Figure 6: Impulse-responses to a 1% shock to productivity, high wage elasticity
of productivity "w;z = 0:96 (worker￿ s bargaining power ￿ = 0:5), all other baseline
calibration targets maintained.






















Key Correlations as a Function of the "Replacement Rate"
















Figure 7: Correlations between unemployment rates and vacancies, output and
employment respectively, plotted as functions of the share of the wage which derives
from reservation utility
b(1￿￿)c
w . The wage elasticity of productivity will deviate
from its baseline value, but all other baseline calibration targets are maintained.




















































Figure 8: Impulse-responses to a 1% shock to productivity, baseline calibration
but at quarterly frequency.









































Figure 9: Sensitivity of key relative labor market volatilities to wage elastic-
ity of productivity "w;z. Weekly calibration, all other baseline calibration targets
maintained.











































Figure 10: Sensitivity of key relative labor market volatilities to participation
elasticity ￿. Weekly calibration, all other baseline calibration targets maintained.
27Appendices
A Solving the Household￿ s Optimization Problem
The household￿ s optimization problem is given by (1) subject to (2)-(5). Substituting the
constraints (3)-(5) into (1) yields
V (nt￿1;kt￿1) = max
ct;it;ut
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
u
2







4(1 ￿ ￿)nt￿1 + ftut | {z }
nt





> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
(27)
subject to
wtnt￿1 + rtkt￿1 + ￿t ￿ ct + it (28)
The ￿rst order conditions are
FOC ct : uc (ct;lt;ut) = ￿t (29)
FOC ut : ul (ct;lt;ut) = uu (ct;lt;ut) + ft￿Et [Vn (nt;kt)] (30)
FOC it : ￿Et [Vk (nt;kt)] = ￿t (31)
where ￿t is the multiplier on the budget constraint (28). The envelope conditions for the
two state variables nt￿1 and kt￿1 are:
Vn (nt￿1;kt￿1) = wt￿t ￿ ul (ct;lt;ut) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [Vn (nt;kt)] (32)
Vk (nt￿1;kt￿1) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [Vk (nt;kt)] + ￿trt (33)
Substituting (29) and (30) into (32) yields (8). Substituting (29) and (31) into (33) yields
(7).
B Deriving Worker￿ s Surplus
The marginal value to the household of an additional employed worker at date t is given
by the envelope condition (32)
Vn;t = wtuc;t ￿ ul;t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Et [Vn;t+1]
28where Vn;t ￿ Vn (nt￿1;kt￿1) and the ￿rst order condition (29) has been used to substitute
out for ￿t. Similarly, the marginal value to the household of an additional unemployed
worker at date t is given by the household￿ s ￿rst order condition for ut (30)
Vu;t = ￿ul;t + uu;t + ft￿Et [Vn;t+1] = 0
As a result, the household￿ s surplus to employment is
Vn;t ￿ Vu;t = wtuc;t ￿ uu;t + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ft)￿Et [Vn;t+1]
Using that at the optimum Vu;t = 0 yields (10).
C Solving the Firm￿ s Problem
The ￿rm￿ s optimization problem is (12) subject to (13)-(15). The ￿rst order condition
with respect to capital kt￿1 is the standard optimality condition relating the rental rate
on capital to its marginal product: rt = ￿
yt









According to (34), ￿rms choose vacancies so that the cost of hiring a worker ￿
qt is equal to
the expected discounted marginal value of a worker to the ￿rm. The envelope condition
with respect to the ￿rm￿ s state variable nt￿1 is given by (18). Combining (18) with (34)
yields the ￿rm￿ s Euler equation for optimal labor choice (17).
D Deriving the Wage Curve
Proof of Proposition 1: The ￿rst order condition of the bargaining problem (19) subject






















29Now taking (36) ahead one period and multiplying both sides by e ￿t+1 yields a closed form



































Future surplus depends only upon aggregate variables. The reason is that the expected
worker￿ s surplus is a search rent, whose value depends only upon the cost of searching for
a new worker ￿
qt. Finally, substitute (11), (18) and (38) into the wage bargain (35) to
obtain the wage curve (20). Q.E.D.
E Consumption-Tightness Relationship
This derivation follows Ravn (2008) closely. Begin with the ￿rst order condition of the











Now, use the ￿rst order condition for the household (30) to substitute out for ￿E [Vn;t+1],


















+ but leads immediately to (22).





















































yt = ct + it + ￿vt
6. transition capital
kt = (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1 + it
7. household time constraint
1 = nt￿1 + ut + lt
8. transition labor
























zt = ￿zt￿1 + "t
31G Log-linearized Equations
1. consumption Euler

















c + ￿l￿ 1
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ f) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) b
c
i
b ft + ￿f w
c b wt+1
+￿ 1
























h ￿ w + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
q
i
(b ct ￿ b ct+1)
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
y




￿wb wt + (1 ￿ ￿)bcb ct + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
y
n
(b yt ￿ b nt￿1) + ￿￿￿b ￿t = 0
5. budget constraint
yb yt ￿ cb ct ￿ v￿b vt ￿ ib it = 0
6. transition capital
￿b kt + (1 ￿ ￿)b kt￿1 + ￿b it = 0
7. household time constraint
nb nt￿1 + ub ut + lb lt = 0
8. transition labor
￿nb nt + (1 ￿ ￿)nb nt￿1 + fu
￿




b yt ￿ zt ￿ ￿b kt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b nt￿1 = 0
10. optimal capital choice
b yt ￿ b kt￿1 ￿ b rt = 0
11. tightness
b ￿t ￿ b vt + b ut = 0
3212. job-￿lling
b qt + ￿b ￿t = 0
13. job-￿nding
b ft ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿t = 0
14. technology
zt = ￿zt￿1 + "t
This is a system of 14 linear equations in the 14 unknowns ￿





As usual, the calibration relies primarily on using steady-state equations to pin down
parameters. The steady state versions of all equilibrium equations are listed here. The
￿rst group are those equations related to the household￿ s problem (1) subject to (2)-(5)




￿ 1 = r ￿ ￿ ￿ e r (39)
Labor Euler : ￿l
￿ 1
￿ =
e r + ￿
e r + ￿ + f
b +
f




Capital accumulation : i = ￿k (41)
Household budget : wn + rk + ￿ = c + i (42)
Time : 1 = n + u + l (43)
Household transition labor : ￿n = fu (44)
The second group are those equations related to the ￿rm￿ s problem (12) subject to
(13)-(15) and its solution (16) and (17).




Firm￿ s labor optimality :
￿
q




Production function : y = An
1￿￿k
￿ (47)




33Finally, there are the expressions for the bargained wage (20):








and the resource constraint (market clearing in the goods market)
c + i + ￿v = y (50)
Note that the resource constraint and the household budget constraint (42) coincide if
pro￿ts are given by ￿ = y ￿ rk ￿ wn ￿ ￿v.
H.2 Baseline Parameters
The calibration is weekly. There are 14 parameters.
1. Technology level A: First, normalize A = 1.
2. A number of parameters are taken directly from the data:
Autocorrelation of shocks : ￿ = 0:9895
Std deviation of "t : ￿" = 0:34 %
Matching elasticity : ￿ = 0:50
Separation rate : ￿ = 0:0081
3. Capital elasticity of output ￿ is set to 0.36, a standard value.
4. Discount factor ￿: The target is that the riskfree interest rate e r ￿ 1
￿ ￿ 1 be 4%
per annum. This yields
(1 + e r)
48 = 1:04
so that weekly e r = 0:00082 and ￿ = 0:9992.
5. Depreciation rate ￿: By (41), i
y = ￿ k
y. By (45): k
y = ￿
r, so that i
y = ￿ ￿
r. By (39)
e r + ￿ = r, so that ￿ = i
y
e r+￿
￿ . Solving for ￿ and using the target i







As a result, the weekly steady state capital rental rate becomes r = ￿ + e r =
0:0027.
346. Scaling of matching function s: First, note that the targets for the job-￿nding
rate f and the job-￿lling rate q pin down steady-state tightness ￿ due to ￿ =
f
q =
0:523. Now, s can be obtained from
f = s￿
1￿￿
so that s = 0:192.
7. Vacancy costs ￿: Now the target for the share of vacancy costs in national income
￿v ￿ ￿v



































1￿￿ = 15:76. As a result, ￿ = 8:28.
8. Worker￿ s bargaining power ￿ is chosen numerically, by iterating over possible
values of ￿ until the wage elasticity of productivity is "w;z = 0:449. This leads to
￿ = 0:026.
9. To continue with the calibration, it is necessary to use the steady state values of
several variables.




(1 ￿ l ￿ u) = 0:0352
u is the fraction of household/population members which is unemployed.
(b) Use the time constraint and the share of non-participants l = 0:36 to obtain
the employment to population ratio h = 1 ￿ u ￿ l = 0:605. The steady state
unemployment rate (as a share of participants) is e u ￿ u
n+u = 5:5%.
(c) The steady-state wage w can be calculated from (46) as w = 9:81.
(d) To ￿nd steady-state consumption c, divide both sides of the steady-state re-
source constraint (50) by n to obtain c
n =
y
n ￿ ￿ k
n ￿ ￿v

















stituting into the equation for c
n yields c
n = 11:57. Finally, one can obtain
steady-state consumption c = n c
n = 6:995.
3510. Unemployment bene￿t b can be obtained from the wage curve (49):







Solving for b yields that b = 1:38.
11. Intertemporal substitution elasticity ￿ is chosen numerically, by iterating over
possible values of ￿ until the volatility of the participation rate relative to output
￿p
￿y matches 0:20, its value in the data. This yields ￿ = 0:768.
12. Weight on leisure in utility ￿: Finally, use the household￿ s labor Euler equation









e r + ￿
e r + f + ￿
b
which yields ￿ = 0:370.
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